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Currie and 1st Canadian Division 
at Second Ypres, Aprill915 
Controversy, Criticisn1 
and Official History 
Tim Travers 
On 22 April1915, 1st Canadian Division was stationed in the Ypres salient, when the first 
gas attack of the war took place. To the left of the 
Canadians was the French 45th Algerian Division, 
which hastily retired in the face of the unexpected 
chlorine gas. It was left, therefore, to 1st Canadian 
Division to fill the gap and restore the situation, 
which was basically achieved by 23 April. 
However, severe German attacks over the next two 
days, 24 and 25 April, tested 1st Canadian 
Division to the limit. The critical problems of these 
two days caused Brigadier-General Arthur Currie 
(General Officer Commanding (GOC), 2nd 
Brigade, in 1st Canadian Division) to order two 
of his battalions to retire during the morning of 
24 April, but the retirement did not take place. 
Further difficulties at midday on 24 April caused 
Currie to again issue retirement orders, and to 
leave his headquarters and seek reinforcements 
to fill a gap on his left. This entailed a visit by 
Currie to the headquarters of the neighbouring 
British 27th Division, commanded by Major-
General T.D'O. Snow. Currie did not rejoin his 
2nd Brigade staff until some time that evening. 
The next day, 25 April, strong German attacks 
and some false information again caused Currie 
in the afternoon to order two of his battalions to 
withdraw. This action took place, to a depth of 
some 1,000 yards, but subsequently the two 
battalions returned to their original positions. 
That night, 2nd Canadian Brigade was replaced 
in the line by a brigade of the British 28th 
Division. 1 
After the war, in 1927, the Official British 
Historian of the First World War, Brigadier 
General Sir James Edmonds, told his friend, 
military historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, of 
this episode: 
Currie three times ordered the Canadians to 
retire, but his troops did not obey. Currie 
reported his orders to Alderson (Lieutenant-
General E.A.H. Alderson, GOC 1st Canadian 
Division) and on telling Snow, the latter said, "If 
Currie was an English Officer I would have had 
him put under arrest and he would probably 
have been shot." ... When recorded in the (British) 
Official History, vol. 3, Currie begged for its 
deletion and this was granted. (It had hung over 
his head for 13 years). 2 
In fact, Currie did not beg for deletion of this 
passage, although he did think that Edmonds was 
"poisoned" against both himself and the staff of 
2nd Canadian Brigade. Perhaps for this reason, 
Currie drafted the reply that Colonel A. F. Duguid, 
the Canadian Official Historian, sent to Edmonds, 
defending Currie's actions.3 Currie was not 
blameless in issuing his three orders to parts of 
his brigade to withdraw. For example, Colonel 
Kirkaldie (Staff officer, 8th Battalion, later 
Brigadier-General, commanding 12th Brigade of 
4th Canadian Division) told General Sir David 
Watson [commander 4th Canadian Division] that 
he had saved 2nd Canadian Brigade at Second 
Ypres, when "He had received orders from Currie 
at midday [24 April] to retire, and with Lipsett 
[Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett, commanding 8th 
Battalion of 2nd Canadian Brigade] was writing 
out orders, and he stated that if Regiment had to 
retire up face ofhill, they would be cleaned out. 
They phoned to [Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert 
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Plumer's VI Corps in line, and found that they 
could hold out, and then asked that order should 
be cancelled, which was granted. They could not 
get Currie, having been told he was away trying 
to get reinforcements. Later, order to retire was 
again sent them, 8th Bn." Later, at 1400 hours 
on 25 April, Currie personally handed over a 
retirement order to Lieutenant-Colonel Tuxford, 
commanding 5th Battalion in 2nd Brigade, but 
although the battalion withdrew it then returned 
and did not leave until after dark that day. Tuxford 
also noted that his battalion had disobeyed orders 
to retire the previous day. 4 
It does seem that Currie was under 
considerable pressure on 24 and 25 April, and 
that he was probably hasty in issuing orders to 
retire on those two days, but it must be 
emphasized that, apart from tremendous German 
pressure, the real culprit was actually Brigadier 
General R.E.W. Turner, V.C., commanding 3rd 
Brigade in 1st Canadian Division. In the late 
morning of 24 April, at 1135 hours, Turner 
ordered his battalions, plus two British 
battalions, to fall back to the GHQ line, which 
left a 3,000 yard gap to the left of 2nd Brigade. 
He was ordered to close the gap, but did not 
respond to 1st Canadian Division's orders, and 
the situation was not restored until the next day, 
partly by British troops and partly by Currie's 
2nd Brigade. Turner's actions, which would have 
been disastrous if the Germans had discovered 
this gap, were covered up firstly by Lieutenant-
General Alderson, and then in the Canadian 
Official History by Colonel Duguid. 5 
Thus far it appears that Edmonds had 
exaggerated Currie's actions, although there was 
a core of truth to his accusations. However, 
Edmonds' reference to Snow's comment about 
Currie probably being shot if he had been an 
English officer, was less reliable, as witnesses of 
Currie's visit to Snow's 27th Division 
headquarters on 24 April later showed. Currie 
himself remarked that: 
As soon as I [Currie] mentioned [to Snow] that 
apparently there was a gap between the left of 
my 8th Bn. and the 3rd Brigade troops, he 
shouted at me and asked how dare I allow such 
a gap to occur. To hear him you would think 
that I personally and solely was responsible for 
that gap ... He roundly abused me and told me to 
get out, shouting at me to "give them hell, give 
them hell." I asked ifl might send a message to 
the 1st Division, but had no sooner sat down at 
a table to write the message when I was told 
that I was taking much too long over it. That 
was an insult and so at variance to the treatment 
which one officer should receive from another 
of superior rank that I was almost 
dumbfounded ... 6 
Currie's version was supported by another 
witness, a Major Lynn, of the Canadian Engineers. 
Lynn remembered that when Currie asked Snow 
for reinforcements, saying that "Your men are 
fresh and their assistance would be of great value," 
Snow replied angrily: "Have you come here to 
teach me my profession and dictate to me how I 
shall handle my division?" Currie repeated his 
request, and Snow responded unhelpfully: "Do 
you expect me to wet nurse your Brigade? You 
have got yourself and your men into a mess and 
you will have to get them out as best you can." 
Finally, Snow cut short the interview: "Enough of 
this, I have heard enough of your harangue. Get 
out of here. Take care of your own line, etc." 
According to Edmonds, Currie had apparently 
shown Snow a conditional withdrawal order to 
the GHQ line for his 2nd Brigade, and Snow 
certainly suspected that Currie wanted to take 
his brigade out of the line, but at the least, 
Edmonds' version of the interview seems skewed 
against Currie.7 
At the same time that Edmonds was relating 
the Currie story to Liddell Hart. he was also 
arguing generally with the Canadian Official 
Historian, Colonel A.F. Duguid, over the role of 
1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres. Summing 
up his disagreements with the Canadian version 
of Second Ypres, Edmonds wrote a report to his 
superiors, the branch of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence that controlled the British 
official histories of the First World War. Edmonds' 
varied criticism of Currie forms a key part of this 
report, but he also raised another general 
problem, namely, the reliability of the Canadian 
Official History due to the absence of certain war 
diaries, and what he saw as the devious conduct 
of Colonel Duguid. Because Edmonds' official 
report to his superiors has never been published 
in full before, it is worth reproducing in order to 
show how suspicious Edmonds was of Currie and 
Duguid, and of the way in which the Canadian 
Official History was being prepared. 
9 
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Text of J.E. Edmonds, "Canadian Comments on 
'1915 (France)"' Vol. 1:, Committee of Imperial 
Defence, Sub-Committee for the Control of the 
Official Histories. Report of the Work of the 
Historical Section by the Secretary. 
The first TS. draft of this volume was circulated 
in the usual way to all the principal surviving 
officers who were concerned, down to the 
battalion commanders. In the case of the Canadian 
Division (which participated in the battle of 
"Second Ypres") a copy was sent to Colonel A.F. 
Duguid, the head of the Canadian Historical 
Section for him to circulate (which he did not do, 
merely sending the remarks of his Section). After 
the receipt of all comments, the chapters were 
revised, and re-typed and copies then sent to the 
War Office and Foreign Office, some of the 
principal officers concerned and again, at his 
request, to Colonel Duguid. 
In May 1926 - 15 months after 1914 Volume II 
was published - the volume was ready to go to 
press, except that the Canadian comments had 
not been received. It had been approved by the 
War Office and by all the British officers 
concerned, including General Sir G. Milne (whom 
Lord Plumer had deputed to act for him in the 
matter) and Lieut.-General Sir E. Alderson, who 
in the period concerned was commanding the 
Canadian Division. He wrote that he considered 
the narrative "excellent and fair." Of the three 
other divisional commanders in "2nd Ypres," 
Lieut.-General Sir E. Bulfin (25th Division) wrote, 
"I am full of admiration of your clear and 
consecutive narrative of events." 
Lieut.-General Sir T. Snow (27th Division) came 
personally to offer his congratulations, and Lieut.-
General Sir. H. Keary (Meerut Division) wrote: 
"I have carefully read through the draft of chapters 
and have compared it carefully with the private 
diary which I kept at the time. I do not find 
anything recorded which I wish altered, nor have 
I any reasonable comment to make." 
The comments of subordinate officers were 
equally satisfactory. 
The drafts of the four chapters in which Canada 
was concerned were sent to Colonel Duguid on 
the 5th January, 22nd January, 11th February 
10 
and 17th February, 1926, respectively. No 
comments were sent off by him from Ottawa until 
16th July (received here 30th July), but in the 
meantime private letters from a little group of 
Canadians who are supporters of General Sir A. 
Currie were received by various persons in 
England, complaining that the narrative was not 
impartial, etc. Among others who received a letter 
from General Currie's particular friend, was Mr. 
Amery, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. 
He was good enough to reply: 
"I have, as you suggested, read the three chapters 
in the second draft. I cannot see anything on the 
face ofthem that could be considered lacking in 
fairness or appreciation or differing in tone 
towards the Canadians from its tone towards 
other units." 
Another who received a letter was Major-General 
Sir. P. Radcliffe, at one time the B.G.G.S. Canadian 
Corps. I sent him the TS., and he wrote: 
"I have read it very carefully, and I honestly do 
not see anything to which exception can be taken 
as regards Canadians at 'Second Ypres."' 
Mr. C.T. Atkinson (Exeter College, Oxford), who 
knows the records thoroughly, wrote: 
"I don't think the Canadians have the least cause 
for accusing this account of lacking in appreciation 
or generosity." 
I had, indeed, covered up a number of unpleasant 
incidents, and particularly the unsoldierly 
behaviour of General Currie and some of the higher 
officers, appointed apparently by the late Sir Sam 
Hughes for political services.x Their conduct, inter 
alia had the result that their commands left the 
front without waiting to be relieved by other 
troops. 
When the Canadian comments arrived, they were 
found to be unimportant: small corrections of 
detail and spelling, whilst obvious typing errors 
were treated as errors of fact: they included also, 
however, corrections of the account of the action 
of British Imperial troops, of which the Canadian 
Historical section had no first-hand information, 
the changes being made in order to give more 
credit to Canadian units. Instead of sending, as 
requested, the remarks of the principal surviving 
x One ran away to Poperingh and reported he was rallying 
his battalion there! 
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Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 
Official British Historian of the First World War 
officers, all of course under the rank of divisional 
commander in 1915, Colonel Duguid only sent 
those of twelve officers, who only concerned 
themselves with a few points: 
General Sir A. Currie (Brigade Commander) 
Principally abuse of General Snow, who did his 
best to prevent him withdrawing his brigade 
prematurely. 
Lieut.-Gen. Turner (Brigade Commander) 
Who denied sending a message from General 
Snow's headquarters, and said he went there 
through "simple curiosity, to see their wonderful 
dug-outs." 
Br.-Gen. Armstrong (C.R.E.) 
Who complained that nothing had been said about 
his supplying engineer stores to Imperial troops 
as well as Canadians. 
Lieut.-Col. Lamb (G.S.) 
Noting his own services as liaison officer (131ines 
only). 
Lieut.-Col. Gordon Hall (G.S.) 
Ten lines comment on the misuse of the divisional 
reserve. 
Br.-Gen. Hayter (Brigade Major) 
Four lines to the effect that "it is difficult to work 
into an official narrative all the small incidents." 
Br.-Gen. King (Battery Commander) 
Explaining the curious retirement of his battery 
across the Canal on the 22nd April. 
Br.-Gen. Sir F. Loomis (Comdt. of St. Julien) 
This officer had been removed from command of 
his battalion and was put in charge of 2 1/2 
companies of reserve. His comments are general 
and abusive: "unfair, unfriendly and ungenerous 
treatment." 
Colonel McCuaig (Company Commander) 
Attempt to minimize the services of a company 
of the Buffs, which stiffened the Canadians. 
Captain Ross (M.G. Officer) 
Seven small useful detail comments. 20 lines in 
all. 
Colonel Anderson (not present) 
General comments on the "unfairness" of the 
draft. 
Colonel A.F. Duguid, Official Canadian 
Historian of the First World War 
(NAC PA 51570) 
11 
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Colonel Meighen (Battalion Commander) 
General comment on the minimizing ofthe share 
of Canadians. 
None of these comments, except Captain Ross's, 
was of the least use, and no explanation of why 
the TS. was not circulated to the numerous other 
surviving officers, not supporters of Sir A. Currie, 
was offered. 
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the 
cablegram notifying the despatch of the comments 
from Ottawa, which arrived on the 30th July, I 
was informed by the High Commissioner's Office 
and the War Office that Colonel Duguid had left 
Canada on a holiday visit to relatives in Scotland. 
I got into communication with Duguid on his 
arrival, and invited him to come to London offering 
to pay expenses. He came at once arriving on 
2nd August. I entertained him, and we spent the 
next four days together. Far from being full of 
Colonial bounce, he was evidently upset and 
uneasy. I requested B.-General Aspinall to be 
present at our first interview, and asked him 
afterwards what he thought of Duguid's attitude. 
He said, "it was like Ajax defying the lightning -
and not half liking the job." 
We went one by one through all the comments, 
Duguid getting more and more ashamed ofthem. 
In the course of time I got the following out of 
him. I had asked him five times in the previous 
year to send me redrafts of any portion of the 
narrative that he did not agree with: he says he 
had direct orders of the C.G.S. NOT to do this, 
but to find every possible fault with the draft. He 
had checked the rank and initials of every officer 
mentioned, the spelling of every name and place 
name and the hour of every event; when accounts, 
time, or even spelling of Belgian place names 
varied, he had suggested the opposite to that one 
which I had accepted. (This is evident in the 
comments.) The object of all this smoke and dust 
was to obscure the real issue which Colonel 
Duguid said was to get expunged from the record 
that on the 24th April Sir A. Currie and his staff 
had made grave mistakes, and on the morning of 
the 25th April, regardless of the troops alongside, 
had ordered the retirement of his brigade, reported 
his action in writing (the message is preserved) 
to the Canadian Division and verbally to General 
Snow (who used rather strong language to him). 
The publication of the whole story of General 
12 
Currie's conduct would ruin his position in Canada 
-where he is passing as a staunch supporter of 
the Imperial connection. To my natural comment, 
why didn't you write this to me and save all this 
bother, he said that he had not been allowed to 
do so in writing. Further, though admitting that 
at the time too much credit had been given to the 
Canadians and too little to the British (I have this 
in writing), he begged for more praise for the 
Canadians, and that the share in the battle of 
General Snow might not be made so prominent, 
(Generals Snow and Hull were singled out for 
special praise by Sir J. French in his dispatch and 
thoroughly deserved it). 
On the advice of Mr. Amery and Mr. Churchill- to 
whom I mentioned the difficulties -I added a little 
more praise, although the British troops at 2nd 
Ypres- particularly the 28th Division, which lost 
three times as many men as the Canadian Division 
- were disgusted at the praise lavished by the 
press on the Canadians, and omitted the incident 
of General Currie's orders and his other dubious 
conduct at Ypres, though it had an effect on the 
position of troops which it is a little difficult to 
hide; and in general I accepted Colonel Duguid's 
proposed corrections where they did not affect 
Imperial troops, in particular that the Canadian 
retirements had been made in good order, and 
that the slow German advance was due to the 
Canadian defence, not, as the Germans say, to 
their troops being of a poor class and unwilling, 
after months of trench warfare, to push on. He 
expressed himself fully satisfied, and wrote me 
the following letter in leaving: 
"S.S. Montcalm, 13th August 1926 
Dear General Edmonds, 
From the above you will see that I leave for 
Canada according to plan, so this is just a line to 
thank you for your kindness and consideration in 
what would otherwise have been a nasty mess. 
With kind regards, I remain, 
Yours sincerely, 
A. Fortescue Duguid" 
When I asked him to let me have a note of his 
expenses, he said that his trip to England was 
paid for officially, and he admitted that the story 
of his being on a holiday was a pretense. I also 
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Lieutenent-General Sir E.A.H. Alderson, General 
Ojjlcer Commanding 1st Canadian Division. 
(NAC PA 168103) 
asked Colonel Duguid why in the eight years since 
peace, with a large historical section, Canada had 
not produced a history of the troops in the war, 
as Australia and New Zealand had done. He replied 
that the Canadians dare not write until the British 
account had appeared, for fear of their version 
not being believed: their plan was to force their 
narrative on us. Sir Max Aitken's (Lord 
Beaverbrook) "Canada in Flanders" he said was 
worthless - as a matter of fact it contains 
statements which upset some of the present 
Canadian claims that they never gave ground. 
To complete the unpleasant story, it should be 
added that it was somewhat difficult in the first 
place to compile the account of 2nd Ypres, as 
the Canadian war diaries of the period for the 
Division and the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades 
(commanded by Generals Currie and Turner) have 
disappeared, and typewritten narratives have been 
substituted for them. These narratives 
unfortunately do not fit in with the war diaries 
that are available. When I asked Lieut.-General 
Sir E. Alderson what value could be placed on 
the divisional narrative, he wrote: 
"I am not surprised that you found the account 
and maps inaccurate. It was written soon after 
by one of my Canadian staff. I did not want to 
hu,rt his feelings. I sent it in muc)1 as he wrote it. 
They were very sensitive, and I often had to do 
that." 
I consulted Field-Marshal Lord Haig on the matter, 
and he said, "the Canadians never were where 
they said they were," and that at Festubert he 
had to send an aeroplane to look for them. 
It should also be placed on record that Duguid 
tried to impose on me as historical material a 
typewritten dossier entitled "Extracts from 
messages, reports, etc. Second Battle ofYpres." 
This purported to be a file of the messages and 
reports arranged in order of narrative time. On 
checking them I found that hours, even days in 
some cases, did not correspond with such originals 
as I had, and that extracts of some sort of narrative 
had been interpolated as contemporaneous 
reports. Colonel Duguid could not say how it was 
that this had happened. 
I have further to report the following incident: In 
1924, when Colonel Duguid was in England to 
collect material for the Canadian Official History, 
we agreed verbally that before the British Historical 
Section published any volumes in which Canadian 
forces were engaged, the draft should be sent to 
Canada for comment, and he volunteered the 
promise that the Canadian Official History should 
be submitted to me. This he subsequently 
repeated in writing. But he has got round the 
promise by publishing in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica Supplement Volume Ill, just issued, an 
entirely misleading account of "Second Ypres." It 
is signed with initials" A.F.D." explained in list of 
contributors as" A. Fortescue Duguid" .x In this he 
devotes nearly the whole space to the Canadian 
Division, only mentions six battalions of the five 
(and part of a sixth) British divisions engaged, 
and entirely omits the Canadian retirement on the 
24th and 25th April 1915 by which a large piece 
of the Salient was lost. Naturally he does not 
mention the counter-attack ofthe British Yorkshire 
Territorials, which drove the Germans out of St. 
Julien after the Canadians had lost it. 
(signed) J.E. Edmonds 1.XII.268 
x It seems certain that he did not expect that his name 
would be divulged. 
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I t is of interest here to get Duguid's side of the story of his visit to Britain. Duguid told the 
Canadian Chief of Staff that he arrived in Scotland 
for his holiday, and then received the anticipated 
invitation from Edmonds for an interview in 
London. Duguid argued that as a result of his 
discussions with Edmonds, liaison between the 
two sections was properly established, that errors 
had been replaced by facts, that the anti-Canadian 
atmosphere at Edmonds' office had been 
dispelled, and that Edmonds had promised a 
third draft for Canadian perusal. 9 Nevertheless, 
it does appear that Duguid was on the defensive, 
that he did conceal some evidence from Edmonds, 
and that there probably had once been a 1st 
Canadian Division war diary which was replaced 
by a later narrative of events. For example, Colonel 
J. Sutherland Brown, DAQMG of 1st Canadian 
Division, told J.H. MacBrien, the Canadian Chief 
of Staff, in 1925, that "The report of the battle 
[Second Ypres] was available but I was informed 
by Col. Lamb [Staff Officer, 1st Canadian Division] 
that the correspondence [between Alderson, GOC 
1st Canadian division, and Turner] had been 
destroyed ... and it is probable that the War Diaries 
compiled at Divisional HQs, together with some 
correspondence connected with the retirement of 
the Third Brigade, were burnt at the same time ... " 
Colonel Cecil Romer, a British staff officer with 
1st Canadian Division, stated that someone in 
"G" branch of 1st Canadian Division kept the 
usual war diary, but "Why and when the latter 
vanished I have no idea." Finally, Brigadier-
General E. de B. Panet, also 1st Canadian Division 
Staff, simply noted that there was a war diary, 
but he did not keep copies, and thought it rather 
extraordinary that they were missing. Duguid 
forwarded "Extracts" ofthis debate to Edmonds 
in January 1926, but omitted the Sutherland 
Brown, Romer and Panet information! 10 
Edmonds' other chief target in his report, the 
allegations against Currie, have been addressed 
above, but one item in Edmonds' report is still 
an open question. Why did Duguid and his 
Canadian official history staff only produce one 
volume of narrative for the years 1914 to 1915 
(plus a documents volume and a medical volume) 
of the Canadian Official History of the First World 
War? Why did this volume take until 1938 to 
appear? And what happened to the other volumes 
for 1916, 1917, and 1918? Edmonds' answer is 
contained in his report, namely, that the Canadian 
14 
strategy was to wait for the British volumes to be 
drafted, and then press their own version onto 
the British volumes, before presumably getting 
on with their own volumes. One letter from 
Duguid seems to support this position, where 
Duguid argues that efforts to make the British 
History accurate had seriously interfered with the 
Canadian Official History, and this seems to be 
the case, for already in 1924 Duguid had laid out 
a projected eight volumes. But under public 
pressure in the late 1930s, Duguid explained that 
the Historical Section was reorganized in 1921, 
and then for 11 years simply collated a large 
quantity of documents and answered queries, 
especially from the British Historical section. 
Then in May 1932, Duguid started writing the 
Canadian History. This still seems a very slow 
rate of progress, but it was not because of staff 
shortages, because Duguid also argued that 
adding to the staff would not help, although the 
present staff should be placed on a permanent 
basis. However, in the end Duguid basically 
argued that the other Canadian volumes were not 
written because the Historical Staff had so many 
other duties to perform, presumably answering 
queries, no doubt largely from Edmonds and his 
staffY 
This story really reveals that the history of 
the Canadians in the First World War is composed 
of two aspects- the events themselves- and then 
how the events were agreed upon and published 
by the official historians of both Britain and 
Canada. There is also the evident and rather 
surprising bias ofEdmonds against the Canadian 
forces (and subsequently other Dominions) as he 
reported to his superiors and wrote his version 
of the First World War. And finally, these 
controversies and criticisms relate to 1st 
Canadian Division in its .first major battle of the 
war, before, according to Robert Graves, it became 
one of the "recognized top-notch divisions" of the 
entire British Expeditionary Force. 12 
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